Republic of the
Supreme Court
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Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz, Complainant, |
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A.C. No. 6850 (Formerly CBD-03-1155) |
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Present: |
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PANGANIBAN, CJ.,
Chairperson, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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Promulgated: |
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Atty. Teodorico |
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Respondent. |
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July
27, 2006 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
A lawyer enjoys the presumption that
he is innocent of the charges filed against him and unless the complainant
proves his allegations by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence, the
complaint against the lawyer must be dismissed.
At bar is another illustration of this
basic precept.
On October 23, 2003, Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz (complainant) filed an Affidavit-Complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that: Atty. Teodorico N. Diesmos (respondent) violated his oath as a lawyer, as follows: (1) respondent filed, in behalf of his clients, Sps. Nathaniel and Felicidad Bunyi (Bunyis), an original application for registration of title before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay,[1] the verification portion of which is false as the community tax certificates used by the spouses are fake; (2) respondent presented Felicidad Bunyi (Felicidad) on July 2, 1999 before the MTC who testified that Lot No. 3064, subject matter of the application, was public land when respondent knew that as early as June 17, 1999, Felicidad already officially received a copy of the certification from the CENRO[2] of Antipolo stating that Lot No. 3064 was subject of a free patent application filed by complainant; (3) he misled the MTC into thinking that the subject lot was still public land when respondent knew that it no longer was, which knowledge is shown by the Notice of Lis Pendens filed by him against the titled property (Lot No. 3064) of complainant and his wife; (4) respondent filed, for the Bunyis, a complaint for reconveyance with cancellation of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City against complainant,[3] fully aware that the claim of ownership by the Bunyis was untrue and without factual or legal basis; and that Lot No. 3064 was already covered by an approved Free Patent in favor of complainant and his wife; (5) he knowingly used as evidence in the complaint for reconveyance, the Decision of the MTC in the application for registration when he knew that said decision was secured through misrepresentation; the decision is still subject of an appeal by the Solicitor General; and that the decision is void because respondent failed to submit the tracing cloth plan of the approved survey of Lot No. 3064 as well as a formal offer of evidence after the testimony of Felicidad on July 2, 1999.[4]
On
In his Answer, respondent explained that: the Bunyis are his clients in two cases, LRC No. 98-3329, an application for original registration and confirmation of title filed before the MTC of Taytay on November 27, 1998 and Civil Case No. 99-5354 entitled “Sps. Nathaniel and Felicidad Bunyi v. Sps. Miniano B. Dela Cruz and Leta Dela Cruz et al” filed before the RTC of Antipolo City on July 1, 1999; respondent was not present when the Bunyis signed the original application for registration of title as the application was subscribed before Notary Public Atty. Antonio Villanueva on November 25, 1998 and it was only on November 26, 1998 that the duly executed and notarized application was returned to him (respondent); even if it were true that the Bunyis used falsified community tax certificates in their application, he was not aware of it and he filed said application in good faith and with the best of intentions; it was not on July 2, 1999 that Felicidad testified before the MTC, but on June 25, 1999, at which time she had not yet received the June 17, 1999 certification referred to by complainant, thus, Felicidad could not have been aware of complainant’s patent application over Lot No. 3064; it is not for complainant to say that the basis of the claim of ownership by the Bunyis are ‘untrue’, ‘void’ or ‘without legal basis’ for it is for the court to decide if the claim has merit; contrary to the allegation of complainant, respondent filed a formal offer of evidence in the application for registration of title of the Bunyis before the MTC; the present complaint was only filed to gain leverage against the Bunyis who oppose complainant’s attempt to deprive them of their property; the Bunyis are also like other litigants in different courts in Rizal who are one in claiming that herein complainant had unlawfully taken away their lands.[6]
On
Complainant thereafter submitted a position paper[8] as well as a supplement[9] reiterating his claims.
On
Commissioner Villadolid found that: complainant failed to establish by convincing proof the commission of the violations imputed against respondent; except for the bare allegations of complainant, there is no evidence to indicate that respondent knew that his clients utilized falsified community tax certificates; neither is there evidence to show that the Bunyis knowingly and intentionally utilized false community tax certificates; the said application for registration shows that the verification portion was not notarized by respondent herein; the records of the proceedings before the MTC also show that Felicidad testified on June 25, 1999 and not July 2, 1999 thus it is credible that when Felicidad testified before the MTC, she and respondent were not yet aware of the certification issued by the CENRO of Antipolo stating that Lot No. 3064 was subject of a free patent application by complainant; upon being informed of the certification, respondent, in behalf of the Bunyis filed a complaint before the RTC to recover Lot No. 3064 and to protect the interests of his clients over the property; the filing of the Notice of Lis Pendens was also aimed at preserving the rights of the Bunyis and to prevent the lot from being transferred to another party without the latter being made aware that the subject property was under litigation; complainant’s allegation that the MTC decision is void is likewise without legal basis as there is a legal presumption of regularity in the issuance of and validity of the said decision and until it is reversed, annulled or set aside, it remains valid and should be accorded evidentiary weight.[11]
On
CBD Case No. 03-1155
Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz
vs.
Atty. Teodorico
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks merit,
the same is hereby DISMISSED.[12]
On August 30, 2005, complainant filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration, herein treated as a petition under Rule 139-B, Section 12 (c) of the Rules of Court, contending that: the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in adopting the baseless report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner, thus, its resolution was void ab initio; the IBP Board of Governors approved and tolerated the gross incompetence or acts of disloyalty of respondent to his clients in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; the IBP Board of Governors failed to notice that the report of the investigating commissioner was so poorly done because of ignorance of the law and gross incompetence in the performance of his duties as he failed to notice the evidence that show that respondent is guilty as charged in the complaint; respondent has the habit of not doing his duty under the law as shown by his failure to submit the original tracing cloth plan, a formal offer of evidence, appellee’s brief to the Court of Appeals and his own position paper in this case; the allegation of the Solicitor General and the statement of Felicidad in her Answer to Request for Admission also proves that she testified on July 2, 1999 and not on June 25, 1999.[13]
Respondent filed his Comment
stating that the IBP was correct in adopting the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner. He
reiterated his defense and added that even if Felicidad answered on
We resolve to deny complainant’s motion.
Disbarment, which complainant wants to be meted upon respondent, is the most severe form of disciplinary action.[15] It should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards.[16]
Consequently, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.[17] Basic is the rule that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations.[18] Thus,
the adage that “he who asserts not he who denies must prove.”[19]
A lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved.[20] The case against respondent must therefore be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar.[21] While courts will not hold back in meting out the proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will also protect them from unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants.[22] This Court will not hesitate to extend its protective arm to those the accusations against whom are not indubitably proven.[23] Indeed, the duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to the administration of discipline to those found culpable of misconduct but also to the protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously charged.[24] In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant evidence, the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed.[25]
Here, complainant asserts that respondent used and filed an application for registration of title before the MTC of Taytay knowing that the community tax certificates of the spouses Bunyi in the verification portion of the application are fake. As correctly observed by the investigating commissioner however, the verification portion of said application was notarized by another lawyer and not by respondent herein. All that complainant was able to prove was that the numbers appearing in the verification portion of the application were not among those issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Taytay for that year. The allegation that respondent knowingly filed an application with a defective verification portion due to falsified community tax certificates was not sufficiently proven and could not be a basis for disciplinary action against respondent.
Complainant also insists that
Felicidad testified on
Also worth mentioning is the fact
that even if June 25, 1999, the date Felicidad was recorded to have testified,
is eight days after June 17, 1999, the date of the CENRO certification,
complainant was not able to show when Felicidad actually received said
certification or that she already received the subject certification when she
testified in court. All that complainant
was able to do was to attach to his Complaint a photocopy of the June 17, 1999
CENRO certification which did not have any marking however as to when it was
actually sent to and received by Felicidad.[30] Complainant also tries to use the allegations
in the Complaint filed by the Bunyis before the RTC to support his claim that
Felicidad already knew about the patent application as of
2.9. During the
hearings of LRC Case No. 98-0029, plaintiffs were required to secure from the
Office of the CENRO, Antipolo, City a certification of their property (
This portion of the Complaint only shows that a
certification was issued by the CENRO on
Complainant in his Motion for Reconsideration also argues that based on the CENRO certification, which was dated June 17, 1999, both respondent and Mrs. Felicidad Bunyi already knew as of June 17, 1999 that Lot No. 3064 is already subject of Free Patent Application by Complainant and was ready for approval by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office, Province of Rizal.[33] Again, such argument is non sequitur and the Court is not persuaded to uphold such reasoning.
Unless complainant can satisfactorily show that Felicidad actually knew that the subject property was no longer public land at the time of her testimony, it must be presumed that she testified with the honest belief that it was still public land and thus she should not be faulted or accused of having testified falsely.
Complainant also asserts that respondent should be disbarred for using the MTC decision to support the civil case respondent filed against complainant before the RTC, as the MTC decision is void for respondent’s failure to submit a tracing cloth plan of the lot as well as a formal offer of evidence.
We find no merit in the contention of complainant that respondent should be disbarred for using the MTC decision to support its civil case before the RTC. By insisting that the MTC decision is void while it is still on appeal, complainant is preempting the evaluation of the higher courts on the validity of such decision. As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, until such decision is reversed or annulled, respondent cannot be faulted for using it to support its case as such decision enjoys the presumption of validity.
As to respondent’s alleged
failure to file a formal offer of evidence, complainant himself, in his motion
for reconsideration later changed his allegation and said that respondent did
file a formal offer of evidence, although it was filed on July 1 or a day
before the date which complainant insists is the date Felicidad testified. As records show that Felicidad took her
testimony on
From the evidence presented, it is clear that complainant failed to present a clear case against respondent. Respondent meanwhile is under no obligation to present overwhelming evidence in his defense.
As the Court explained in Angeles v. Figueroa:[34]
x x x a mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the
charge. This brings to the fore the application of the age-old but
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations x x x [R]espondent
x x x is not under obligation to prove his negative averment, much less to
disprove what has not been proved by complainants. Thus, we have
consistently held that if the complainant/ plaintiff, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner
the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent/defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.
The reason for this rule is that:
The profession of an attorney is
acquired after long and laborious study. It is a lifetime
profession. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney may be
able to amass considerable means to support himself and his family, besides the
honor and prestige that accompany his office and profession. To deprive
him of such honored station in life which would result in irreparable injury
must require proof of the highest degree x x x.
While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary
punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties they will, on
the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied
litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost
entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to
be deplored. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled opponents, may
not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to
vent their rancor on members of the Bar.[35]
As a final word, the Court notes that
after the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Villadolid, complainant stated that the Board of Governors acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction as “they failed to notice that the report of
the investigating commissioner was so poorly done because of ignorance of the
law and gross incompetence in the performance of his duties as he failed to
notice the evidence that show that Atty. Diesmos is guilty as charged in the
complaint.” The fact that the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Dela Cruz’s complaint to be wanting does
not merit the derogatory accusation that Commissioner Villadolid was ignorant
of the law and grossly incompetent in the performance of his duties. A thorough review of the records
reveals that the report and recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid which was
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors was well supported by the records and is
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
Complainant is therefore reminded that while a lawyer’s language may be
forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting
the dignity of the legal profession.
Using intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of the judicial forum.[36]
WHEREFORE,
complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit and
Resolution No. XVI-2005-253 of the Integrated Bar of the
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
[1] Docketed as LRC Case No. 98-6028.
[2] Community Environment and Natural Resources Office.
[3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 99-5354.
[4] Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Uytengsu
III v. Baduel, A.C. No. 5134,
[16]
[17] Id.; Gaviola v. Salcedo, A.C. No. 3037, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 563, 566; Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 258, 264; Asturias v. Serrano, A.C. No. 6538, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 97, 105; Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho, A.C. No. 6403, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 202, 208.
[18] Uytengsu III v. Baduel, supra note 16.
[19] Berbano
v.
[20] Uytengsu III v. Baduel, supra note 16.
[21] Gaviola
v. Salcedo, supra note 18; Uytengsu III v. Baduel, supra note 16; Berbano
v.
[22] Gaviola v. Salcedo, supra note 18.
[23]
[24] Aquino
v. Villamar-Mangaoang, A.C. No. 4934,
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] A.C.
No. 5050,
[35]
[36] Cruz
v. Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737,